Optimal storage and transmission investments in a bilevel electricity market model
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This paper analyzes the interplay of transmission and storage investments in a multistage game that we translate into a bilevel market model. In particular, on the first level we assume that a transmission system operator chooses optimal line investments and a corresponding optimal network fee. On the second level we model competitive firms that trade energy on a zonal market with limited transmission capacities and decide on their optimal storage facility investments. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to analyze interdependent transmission and storage facility investments in a zonal market environment that accounts for the described hierarchical decision structure. As a first best benchmark, we also present an integrated, single-level problem that may be interpreted as a long-run nodal pricing model. Our numerical results show that adequate storage facility investments of firms may in general have the potential to reduce the amount of line investments of the transmission system operator. However, our bilevel zonal pricing model may yield inefficient investments in storages, which may be accompanied by suboptimal network facility extensions as compared to the nodal pricing benchmark. In this context, the chosen zonal configuration of the network will highly influence the equilibrium investment outcomes including the size and location of the newly invested facilities. As zonal pricing is used for instance in Australia or Europe, our models may be seen as valuable tools for evaluating different regulatory policy options in the context of long-run investments in storage and network facilities.
KeywordsBilevel problem Multistage game Congestion management Zonal pricing Storage facilities Long-run investments Decision support
We thank Claudia Ehrig, Arie M.C.A. Koster, Katja Kutzer, Paul Schott and Nils Spiekermann for their valuable comments and discussions. In addition, we highly acknowledge the good cooperation with Veronika Grimm, Alexander Martin, Martin Schmidt, Christian Sölch, and Gregor Zöttl at the Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg in the past years.
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