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Annals of Operations Research

, Volume 264, Issue 1–2, pp 235–265 | Cite as

Representation-compatible power indices

  • Serguei Kaniovski
  • Sascha Kurz
Original Paper
  • 56 Downloads

Abstract

This paper studies power indices based on average representations of a weighted game. If restricted to account for the lack of power of null voters, average representations become coherent measures of voting power, with power distributions being proportional to the distribution of weights in the average representation. This makes these indices representation-compatible, a property not fulfilled by classical power indices. In this paper we introduce two computationally cheaper alternatives to the existing representation-compatible power indices, and study the properties of a family that now comprises four measures.

Keywords

First average representation Power index Proportionality between weights and power 

Mathematics Subject Classification

91A12 91A80 

Notes

Acknowledgements

We are greatly indebted to three anonymous reviewers, whose critique considerably improved the quality of this paper. We would also like to thank the participants of the 27th European Conference on Operational Research in 2015 and the annual conference of the German Operations Research Society (GOR) in 2015 for their comments and suggestions.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO)ViennaAustria
  2. 2.University of BayreuthBayreuthGermany

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