Annals of Operations Research

, Volume 223, Issue 1, pp 121–136 | Cite as

Finding maxmin allocations in cooperative and competitive fair division

  • Marco Dall’AglioEmail author
  • Camilla Di Luca


We define a subgradient algorithm to compute the maxmin value of a completely divisible good in both competitive and cooperative strategic contexts. The algorithm relies on the construction of upper and lower bounds for the optimal value which are based on the convexity properties of the range of utility vectors associated to all possible divisions of the good. The upper bound always converges to the optimal value. Moreover, if two additional hypotheses hold: that the preferences of the players are mutually absolutely continuous, and that there always exists relative disagreement among the players, then also the lower bound converges, and the algorithm finds an approximately optimal allocation.


Fair division theory Cooperative game theory Convex optimization Subgradient algorithms 



The authors would like to thank Professor Farhad Huseynov, School of Business, ADA University, Baku, Azerbaijan, and Visiting Professor at Luiss, Rome, Italy, for several comments and suggestions that helped improving the paper. The authors keep full responsibility for possible errors.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.LUISS UniversityRomeItaly

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