Annals of Operations Research

, Volume 222, Issue 1, pp 389–418 | Cite as

Modelling counter-intuitive effects on cost and air pollution from intermittent generation

Article

Abstract

In this paper, we first present a market environment with a conventional two settlement mechanism. We show that when we add some wind generation to the system, the steady-state market conditions yield lower social and consumer welfare and higher use of fossil fuels. We also present results of a counterfactual stochastic settlement market which improves social and consumer welfare after the introduction of new intermittent generation. Thus, we conclude that the choice of market mechanism is a critical factor for capturing the benefits of large-scale wind integration.

We also introduce a method to compute analytical equilibria of games in which the payoff functions of players depend on the optimal solution to an optimization problem with inequality constraints.

Keywords

Electricity markets Uncertainty Wind energy Inefficiency Cost of wind integration Game theory Stochastic optimization Equilibrium models 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Javad Khazaei
    • 1
  • Anthony Downward
    • 2
  • Golbon Zakeri
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Operations Research and Financial EngineeringPrinceton UniversityPrincetonUSA
  2. 2.Department of Engineering ScienceUniversity of AucklandAucklandNew Zealand

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