The Shapley value for bicooperative games
The aim of the present paper is to study a one-point solution concept for bicooperative games. For these games introduced by Bilbao (Cooperative Games on Combinatorial Structures, 2000) , we define a one-point solution called the Shapley value, since this value can be interpreted in a similar way to the classical Shapley value for cooperative games. The main result of the paper is an axiomatic characterization of this value.
KeywordsBicooperative game Shapley value
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