Annals of Operations Research

, Volume 137, Issue 1, pp 191–209 | Cite as

Implementation of the Levels Structure Value

Abstract

We implement the levels structure value (Winter, 1989) for cooperative transfer utility games with a levels structure. The mechanism is a generalization of the bidding mechanism by Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001).

Keywords

levels structure value implementation TU games 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Facultade de Económicas, As Lagoas MarcosendeUniversidade de VigoVigoSpain

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