Fast core pricing algorithms for path auction

  • Hao ChengEmail author
  • Wentao Zhang
  • Yi Zhang
  • Lei Zhang
  • Jun Wu
  • Chongjun Wang


Path auction is held in a graph, where each edge stands for a commodity and the weight of this edge represents the prime cost. Bidders own some edges and make bids for their edges. The auctioneer needs to purchase a sequence of edges to form a path between two specific vertices. Path auction can be considered as a kind of combinatorial reverse auctions. Core-selecting mechanism is a prevalent mechanism for combinatorial auction. However, pricing in core-selecting combinatorial auction is computationally expensive, one important reason is the exponential core constraints. The same is true of path auction. To solve this computation problem, we simplify the constraint set and get the optimal set with only polynomial constraints in this paper. Based on our constraint set, we put forward two fast core pricing algorithms for the computation of bidder-Pareto-optimal core outcome. Among all the algorithms, our new algorithms have remarkable runtime performance. Finally, we validate our algorithms on real-world datasets and obtain excellent results.


Path auction Core Pricing algorithm Constraint set 



This paper is supported by the National Key Research and Development Program of China (Grant No. 2018YFB1403400), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 61876080), the Collaborative Innovation Center of Novel Software Technology and Industrialization at Nanjing University.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hao Cheng
    • 1
    Email author
  • Wentao Zhang
    • 1
  • Yi Zhang
    • 1
  • Lei Zhang
    • 1
  • Jun Wu
    • 1
  • Chongjun Wang
    • 1
  1. 1.National Key Laboratory for Novel Software Technology, Department of Computer Science and TechnologyNanjing UniversityNanjingChina

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