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Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems

, Volume 33, Issue 5, pp 540–563 | Cite as

Chore division on a graph

  • Sylvain BouveretEmail author
  • Katarína Cechlárová
  • Julien Lesca
Article
  • 60 Downloads

Abstract

The paper considers fair allocation of indivisible nondisposable items that generate disutility (chores). We assume that these items are placed in the vertices of a graph and each agent’s share has to form a connected subgraph of this graph. Although a similar model has been investigated before for goods, we show that the goods and chores settings are inherently different. In particular, it is impossible to derive the solution of the chores instance from the solution of its naturally associated fair division instance. We consider three common fair division solution concepts, namely proportionality, envy-freeness and equitability, and two individual disutility aggregation functions: additive and maximum based. We show that deciding the existence of a fair allocation is hard even if the underlying graph is a path or a star. We also present some efficiently solvable special cases for these graph topologies.

Keywords

Computational social choice Resource allocation Fair division Indivisible chores 

Notes

Acknowledgements

This work has been supported by the bilateral Slovak-French Grant of Campus France PHC STEFANIK 2018, 40562NF and Slovak Research and Development Agency APVV SK-FR-2017-0022. Sylvain Bouveret is also supported by the Project ANR-14-CE24-0007-01 CoCoRICo-CoDec. Katarína Cechlárová is also supported by VEGA Grants 1/0311/18 and 1/0056/18. Julien Lesca is also supported by the CNRS PEPS project JCJC Mappoleon. The authors would also like to thank anonymous referees who helped to improve the paper.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.CNRS, Grenoble INP, LIGUniv. Grenoble AlpesGrenobleFrance
  2. 2.P.J. Šafárik UniversityKosiceSlovakia
  3. 3.PSL, CNRS, LAMSADEUniversité Paris-DauphineParisFrance

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