Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems

, Volume 30, Issue 6, pp 1117–1147 | Cite as

Simulating protection rackets: a case study of the Sicilian Mafia

  • Luis G. Nardin
  • Giulia Andrighetto
  • Rosaria Conte
  • Áron Székely
  • David Anzola
  • Corinna Elsenbroich
  • Ulf Lotzmann
  • Martin Neumann
  • Valentina Punzo
  • Klaus G. Troitzsch
Article
First Online:

Abstract

Protection racketeering groups are powerful, deeply entrenched in multiple societies across the globe, and they harm the societies and economies in which they operate in multiple ways. These reasons make their dynamics important to understand and an objective of both scientific and application-oriented interest. Legal and social norm-based approaches arguably play significant roles in influencing protection racket dynamics. We propose an agent-based simulation model, the Palermo Scenario, to enrich our understanding of these influences and to test the effect of different policies on protection racket dynamics. Our model integrates the legal and the social norm-based approaches and uses a complex normative agent architecture that enables the analysis of both agents’ behaviours and mental normative representations driving behaviour. We demonstrate the usefulness of the model and the benefits of using this complex normative architecture through a case study of the Sicilian Mafia.

Keywords

Protection rackets Norms Normative agent architecture Sicilian Mafia 
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Notes

Acknowledgments

This work was partially supported by the FP7-ICT Science of Global Systems programme of the European Commission through Project GLODERS (http://www.gloders.eu, Global Dynamics of Extortion Racket Systems) under Grant agreement no.: 315874. This work reflects the views solely of its authors. The European Commission is not liable for any use that may be made of the information in the work. We also acknowledge the invaluable comments and suggestions of the anonymous reviewers that helped improving the paper in several aspects.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Luis G. Nardin
    • 1
  • Giulia Andrighetto
    • 1
    • 2
  • Rosaria Conte
    • 1
  • Áron Székely
    • 1
  • David Anzola
    • 4
  • Corinna Elsenbroich
    • 4
  • Ulf Lotzmann
    • 3
  • Martin Neumann
    • 3
  • Valentina Punzo
    • 5
  • Klaus G. Troitzsch
    • 3
  1. 1.Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, CNRRomeItaly
  2. 2.European University InstituteFiesoleItaly
  3. 3.Universität Koblenz-LandauKoblenzGermany
  4. 4.Centre for Research in Social SimulationUniversity of SurreyGuildfordUK
  5. 5.Department of Law, Society and SportUniversity of PalermoPalermoItaly

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