Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems

, Volume 19, Issue 2, pp 153–172

Gossip-based aggregation of trust in decentralized reputation systems

  • Yoram Bachrach
  • Ariel Parnes
  • Ariel D. Procaccia
  • Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
Article

Abstract

Decentralized Reputation Systems have recently emerged as a prominent method of establishing trust among self-interested agents in online environments. A key issue is the efficient aggregation of data in the system; several approaches have been proposed, but they are plagued by major shortcomings. We put forward a novel, decentralized data management scheme grounded in gossip-based algorithms. Rumor mongering is known to possess algorithmic advantages, and indeed, our framework inherits many of their salient features: scalability, robustness, a global perspective, and simplicity. We demonstrate that our scheme motivates agents to maintain a very high reputation, by showing that the higher an agent’s reputation is above the threshold set by its peers, the more transactions it would be able to complete within a certain time unit. We analyze the relation between the amount by which an agent’s average reputation exceeds the threshold and the time required to close a deal. This analysis is carried out both theoretically, and empirically through a simulation system called GossipTrustSim. Finally, we show that our approach is inherently impervious to certain kinds of attacks.

Keywords

Reputation systems Trust Gossip Manipulation Game theory 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Abdul-Rahman, A., & Hailes, S. (2000). Supporting trust in virtual communities. In HICSS’00: Proceedings of the 33rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (Vol. 6, p. 6007). Washington, DC: IEEE Computer Society. ISBN: 0-7695-0493-0.Google Scholar
  2. Aberer, K. (2001). P-grid: A self-organizing access structure for P2P information systems. In C. Batini, F. Giunchiglia, P. Giorgini, & M. Mecella (Eds.), Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Coopersative Information Systems (CoopIS 2001), Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Vol. 2172, pp. 179–194). Springer-Verlag, London, UK. http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/aberer01grid.html.
  3. Aberer, K., & Despotovic, Z. (2001). Managing trust in a peer-2-peer information system. In Proceedings of the Tenth International Conference on Information and Knowledge Management (pp. 310–317).Google Scholar
  4. Akerlof G.A. (1970) The market for lemons: Qualitative uncertainty and the market mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 84: 488–500CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Amar, L., Barak, A., Levy, E., & Okun, M. (2007). An on-line algorithm for fair-share node allocations in a cluster. In CCGRID’07: Proceedings of the Seventh IEEE International Symposium on Cluster Computing and the Grid (pp. 83–91). Washington, DC: IEEE Computer Society. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CCGRID.2007.22. ISBN: 0-7695-2833-3.
  6. Awerbuch B., & Kleinberg, R. D. (2005). Competitive collaborative learning. In COLT: Proceedings of the Workshop on Computational Learning Theory, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers.Google Scholar
  7. Axelrod, R. (1984). The evolution of cooperation. Basic Books.Google Scholar
  8. Barak, A., Guday, S., & Wheeler, R. G. (1993). The MOSIX distributed operating system, load balancing for UNIX. Lecture notes in computer science (LNCS) (Vol. 672). Berlin; New York: Springer.Google Scholar
  9. Barak A., La’adan O. (1998) The MOSIX multicomputer operating system for high performance cluster computing. Future Generation Computer Systems 13(4–5): 361–372CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Cheng, A., & Friedman, E. (2005). Sybilproof reputation mechanisms. In P2PECON’05: Proceeding of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-peer Systems (pp. 128–132). New York, NY, USA: ACM.Google Scholar
  11. Cornelli, F., Damiani, E., De Capitani di Vimercati, S., Paraboschi, S., & Samarati, P. (2002). Choosing reputable servants in a P2P network. In Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on the World Wide Web (pp. 376–386).Google Scholar
  12. Cybenko, G., & Jiang, G. (1999). Matching conflicts: Functional validation of agents. In Proceedings of the AAAI Workshop on Agent Conflicts (pp. 14–19).Google Scholar
  13. Damiani, E., De Capitani di Vimercati, S., Paraboschi, S., Samarati, P., & Violante, F. (2002). A reputation-based approach for choosing reliable resources in peer-to-peer networks. In CCS’02: Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Washington, DC (pp. 207–216). New York: ACM. http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/586110.586138. ISBN: 1-58113-612-9.
  14. Dellarocas, C. (2000). Immunizing online reputation reporting systems against unfair ratings and discriminatory behavior. In EC’00: Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (pp. 150–157). New York: ACM. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/352871.352889. ISBN: 1581132727.
  15. Dellarocas, C. (2001). Analyzing the economic efficiency of eBay-like online reputation mechanisms. In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-01), Tampa, Florida.Google Scholar
  16. Demers, A., Greene, D., Hauser, C., Irish, W., Larson, J., Shenker, S., et al. (1987). Epidemic algorithms for replicated database maintenance. In PODC’87: Proceedings of the Sixth Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada (pp. 1–12). New York: ACM. http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/41840.41841. ISBN: 0-89791-239-4.
  17. Dewan, P. (2004). Peer-to-peer reputations. In Proceedings of the 18th International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium.Google Scholar
  18. Friedman E.J., Resnick P. (2001) The social cost of cheap pseudonyms. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 10(2): 173–199CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Frieze A.M., Grimmett G.R. (1985) The shortest-path problem for graphs with random arc-lengths. Discrete Applied Mathematics 10: 57–77MATHCrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  20. Fudenberg, D., & Levine, D. K. (1995). Reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player. Levine’s Working Paper Archive 103, UCLA Department of Economics, January. http://ideas.repec.org/p/cla/levarc/103.html.
  21. Jelasity, M., Montresor, A., & Babaoglu, O. (2003). Towards secure epidemics: Detection and removal of malicious peers in epidemic-style protocols. Technical Report UBLCS-2003-14, Department of Computer Science, University of Bologna.Google Scholar
  22. Jelasity M., Montresor A., Babaoglu O. (2005) Gossip-based aggregation in large dynamic networks. ACM Transactions on Computer Systems 23(3): 219–252CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Kandori, M. (1992). Social norms and community enforcement. The Review of Economic Studies, pp. 63–80.Google Scholar
  24. Kempe, D., Dobra, A., & Gehrke, J. (2003).Gossip-based computation of aggregate information. In FOCS’03: Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (p. 482). Washington, DC: IEEE Computer Society. ISBN: 0-7695-2040-5.Google Scholar
  25. Keyani, P., Larson, B., & Senthil, M. (2002). Peer pressure: Distributed recovery from attacks in peer-to-peer systems. In Proceedings of the International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Computing (pp. 306–320).Google Scholar
  26. Kreps, D. M., & Wilson, R. (1982, August). Reputation and imperfect information. Journal of Economic Theory, 305–15.Google Scholar
  27. Leitao, J., Pereira, J., & Rodrigues, L. (2007). Epidemic broadcast trees. In Proceedings of the 26th IEEE International Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems, 10–12 October 2007 (pp. 301–310). Washington, DC: IEEE Computer Society.Google Scholar
  28. Marsh, S. P. (1994). Formalising trust as a computational concept. PhD thesis, University of Stirling.Google Scholar
  29. Pandurangan, G., Raghavan, P., & Upfal, E. (2001). Building low diameter P2P networks. In Proceedings of the 42nd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (pp. 492–499).Google Scholar
  30. Resnick, P., & Zeckhauser, R. (2002). Trust among strangers in internet transactions: Empirical analysis of eBay’s reputation system. Advances in Applied Microeconomics, 11.Google Scholar
  31. Resnick, P., & Zeckhauser, R. J. (2003). Eliciting honest feedback in electronic markets. KSG Working Paper Series RWP02-039.Google Scholar
  32. Srivatsa, M., Xiong, L., & Liu, L. (2005). TrustGuard: Countering vulnerabilities in reputation management for decentralized overlay networks. In WWW’05: Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on World Wide Web, Chiba, Japan (pp. 422-431). New York: ACM. http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1060745.1060808. ISBN:1-59593-046-9.
  33. Xiong, L., & Liu, L. (2003). A reputation-based trust model for peer-to-peer ecommerce communities [Extended Abstract]. In EC’03: Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, San Diego, CA (pp. 228–229). New York: ACM. http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/779928.779972. ISBN: 1-58113-679-X.

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yoram Bachrach
    • 1
  • Ariel Parnes
    • 1
  • Ariel D. Procaccia
    • 2
  • Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Engineering and Computer ScienceThe Hebrew University of JerusalemJerusalemIsrael
  2. 2.Microsoft Israel R&D CenterHerzeliyaIsrael

Personalised recommendations