Acta Biotheoretica

, Volume 67, Issue 2, pp 87–102 | Cite as

The Coherence of Evolutionary Theory with Its Neighboring Theories

  • Seungbae ParkEmail author
Regular Article


Evolutionary theory coheres with its neighboring theories, such as the theory of plate tectonics, molecular biology, electromagnetic theory, and the germ theory of disease. These neighboring theories were previously unconceived, but they were later conceived, and then they cohered with evolutionary theory. Since evolutionary theory has been strengthened by its several neighboring theories that were previously unconceived, it will be strengthened by infinitely many hitherto unconceived neighboring theories. This argument for evolutionary theory echoes the problem of unconceived alternatives. Ironically, however, the former recommends that we take the realist attitude toward evolutionary theory, while the latter recommends that we take the antirealist attitude toward it.


Coherence Evolutionary theory Joint explanation Unconceived neighboring theories 



I am grateful to the two anonymous referees of this journal for sharp comments. This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2016S1A5A2A01022592).


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Ulsan National Institute of Science and TechnologyUlsanRepublic of Korea

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