The Organizational Account of Function is an Etiological Account of Function
- 213 Downloads
The debate on the notion of function has been historically dominated by dispositional and etiological accounts, but recently a third contender has gained prominence: the organizational account. This original theory of function is intended to offer an alternative account based on the notion of self-maintaining system. However, there is a set of cases where organizational accounts seem to generate counterintuitive results. These cases involve cross-generational traits, that is, traits that do not contribute in any relevant way to the self-maintenance of the organism carrying them, but instead have very important effects on organisms that belong to the next generation. We argue that any plausible solution to the problem of cross-generational traits shows that the organizational account just is a version of the etiological theory and, furthermore, that it does not provide any substantive advantage over standard etiological theories of function.
KeywordsFunction Organizational account Etiological account Cross-generational trait Epiphenomenalism
Financial support for this work was provided by the DGI, Spanish Government, research project FFI2011-26853 and Consolider-Ingenio project CSD2009-00056; the Generalitat de Catalunya, under grant 2014-SGR-81; a Postdoctoral Fellowship at the Instituto de Investigaciones Filosoficas (UNAM) and a Postdoctoral Fellowship at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München.
- Allen C (2009) Teleological notions in biology. In: Zalta EN (ed) The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, 2009 edn. Stanford University, StanfordGoogle Scholar
- Artiga M (2011) Re-organizing organizational accounts of function. Appl Ontol 6(2):105–124Google Scholar
- Christensen WD, Bickhard MH (2002) The process dynamics of normative function. Monist 12(6):795–823Google Scholar
- Davies PS (2001) Norms of nature: naturalism and the nature of functions. MIT Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
- Delancey CS (2006) Ontology and teleofunctions: a defense and revision of the systematic account of teleological explanation. Synthese 150(1):69–98Google Scholar
- Millikan RG (1984) Language, thought and other biological categories. MIT Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
- Millikan RG (1993) White queen psychology and other essays for Alice. MIT Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
- Millikan RG (2002) Biofunctions: two paradigms. In: Ariew A, Cummins R, Perlman M (eds) Functions. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 113–143Google Scholar
- Wilson RA, Craver CF (2006) Realization: metaphysical and scientific perspectives. In: Gabbay DM, Woods J, Thagard P (eds) Philosophy of psychology and cognitive science. North Holland, Amsterdam, pp 81–104Google Scholar