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International Economics and Economic Policy

, Volume 10, Issue 4, pp 583–612 | Cite as

On the institutional design of burden sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU

  • Claus-Jochen Haake
  • Tim Krieger
  • Steffen Minter
Original Paper
  • 245 Downloads

Abstract

Illegal immigration affects not only EU member states adjacent, but also those distant from the Mediterranean Sea due to open internal borders and intra-EU onward migration. Member states without a direct influx of illegal immigrants may therefore free-ride on border countries’ enforcement efforts, leading to a sub-optimal level of border control when immigration policy remains uncoordinated. By applying a numerical example, we show that an expected externality mechanism leads to voluntary preference revelation with respect to immigration policy under several (but not all) scenarios, thereby avoiding strategic behavior in the regular negotiation process. This policy measure requires, however, the EU Commission to take on a very active role as moderator between member states (rather than as legislator).

Keywords

Illegal migration Immigration policy Border enforcement Interregional transfers European Union Expected externality mechanism 

JEL Classification

F22 J61 J68 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Claus-Jochen Haake
    • 1
  • Tim Krieger
    • 2
  • Steffen Minter
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of PaderbornPaderbornGermany
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsUniversity of FreiburgFreiburgGermany

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