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The euro after Meseberg

  • Barry Eichengreen
Original Paper

Abstract

The Meseberg Declaration of June 2018 summarizes the state of play on euro area reform. It indicates areas where there is agreement in principle between leading governments on measures to strengthen the resilience of their monetary union, but no agreement as yet on how to implement those measures. It indicates also areas where there is not even agreement in principle. It thus provides a basis for addressing the question of whether Europe is ready for the next crisis. The absence of bank concentration charges, a European safe asset, European deposit insurance, changes in ESM governance and meaningful fiscal reform suggests that the answer is no. More positively, Meseberg at least recommends some small steps in these directions.

Keywords

Monetary union Euro Reform 

JEL Classification

F00 F30 

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Copyright information

© Kiel Institute 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of California, BerkeleyBerkeleyUSA

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