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Wirtschaftsdienst

, Volume 93, Issue 10, pp 678–685 | Cite as

EZB-Krisenpolitik: OMT-Programm, Vollzuteilungspolitik und Lender of Last Resort

  • Adalbert Winkler
Analysen und Berichte EWU

Zusammenfassung

Im Juni 2013 fand in Karlsruhe die mündliche Verhandlung im Hauptsacheverfahren Europäischer Stabilitätsmechanismus/Europäische Zentralbank statt. Dabei ging es im Kern um die Frage, ob das Outright-Monetary-Transactions-Programm der EZB mandatswidrig ist. Die ökonomische Logik, die zu dem Ergebnis führt, dass die EZB ihr Mandat überschreitet, gilt aber auch für die Vollzuteilungspolitik der EZB.

ECB crisis policies: OMT, full allotment and the lender of the last resort

Abstract

This paper applies the economic argumentation put forth by the OMT’s opponents before the German Federal Constitutional Court [Bundesverfassungsgericht] to the full allotment policy practiced by the ECB since October 2008. The comparison shows that under this line of reasoning, the full allotment policy also contravenes the ECB’s mandate. Ultimately, therefore, the ECB is not in court because of monetary financing, but rather in its role as a lender of last resort. Accordingly, a court decision against the OMT would endorse an economic argumentation which contradicts 150 years of modern central bank history.

JEL Classification

E52 E53 F33 

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Copyright information

© ZBW and Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Adalbert Winkler

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