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Intereconomics

, Volume 54, Issue 4, pp 237–249 | Cite as

What Drives the Responsiveness of the Budget Balance to the Business Cycle in EU Countries?

  • Gilles MourreEmail author
  • Aurélien Poissonnier
Cyclically Adjusted Budget Balance
  • 29 Downloads

Abstract

The European Commission methodology for computing the cyclically adjusted government budget balance provides a robust measurement of the fiscal position of the Member States. The fiscal semi-elasticities at the core of this method are structural parameters, mostly of fiscal nature, not linked to cyclical or other economic factors. Fiscal semi-elasticities also exhibit an emulation effect between neighbours and some groupings of countries.

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Copyright information

© ZBW and Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Unit C1: Fiscal Policy and SurveillanceEuropean Commission DG ECFINBrusselsBelgium

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