Equilibria in load balancing games

Article

Abstract

A Nash equilibrium (NE) in a multi-agent game is a strategy profile that is resilient to unilateral deviations. A strong Nash equilibrium (SE) is one that is stable against coordinated deviations of any coalition. We show that, in the load balancing games, NEs approximate SEs in the sense that the benefit of each member of any coalition from coordinated deviations is well limited. Furthermore, we show that an easily recognizable special subset of NEs exhibit even better approximation of SEs.

Keywords

Nash equilibrium load balancing approximation 

2000 MR Subject Classification

91B50 68M20 

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Copyright information

© Institute of Applied Mathematics, Academy of Mathematics and System Sciences, Chinese Academy of Sciences and Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Qufu Normal UniversityShandongChina
  2. 2.Warwick Business SchoolUniversity of WarwickWarwickUK

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