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Broadcast anonymous routing (BAR): scalable real-time anonymous communication

  • Panayiotis KotzanikolaouEmail author
  • George Chatzisofroniou
  • Mike Burmester
Regular Contribution

Abstract

We propose BAR, a scalable anonymous Internet communication system that combines broadcasting features of dc-net with layered encryption of mix-nets. The main advantage of BAR over other broadcast systems is bandwidth configurability: by using selective broadcasting it can significantly reduce the required bandwidth for a small increase in latency, without affecting anonymity. Unlike mix-net systems, BAR provides unlinkability protection while minimizing the use of public key operations. BAR provides sender, receiver and session anonymity with forward secrecy. We analyze the efficiency of BAR for several anonymity configurations by using a prototype implementation.

Keywords

Sender/receiver anonymity Unlinkability Dc-net Mix-nets 

Notes

Acknowledgments

The work of the first author was partially supported by the European Commission under the Horizon 2020 Programme (H2020), as part of the OPERANDO project (Grant Agreement no. 653704)

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Panayiotis Kotzanikolaou
    • 1
    Email author
  • George Chatzisofroniou
    • 1
  • Mike Burmester
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of InformaticsUniversity of PiraeusPiraeusGreece
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceFlorida State UniversityTallahasseeUSA

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