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International Journal of Information Security

, Volume 12, Issue 4, pp 267–297 | Cite as

Less is more: relaxed yet composable security notions for key exchange

  • C. Brzuska
  • M. Fischlin
  • N. P. SmartEmail author
  • B. Warinschi
  • S. C. Williams
Regular Contribution

Abstract

Although they do not suffer from clear attacks, various key agreement protocols (for example that used within the TLS protocol) are deemed as insecure by existing security models for key exchange. The reason is that the derived keys are used within the key exchange step, violating the usual key-indistinguishability requirement. In this paper, we propose a new security definition for key exchange protocols that offers two important benefits. Our notion is weaker than the more established ones and thus allows the analysis of a larger class of protocols. Furthermore, security in the sense that we define enjoys rather general composability properties. In addition, our composability properties are derived within game-based formalisms and do not appeal to any simulation-based paradigm. Specifically, we show that for protocols, whose security relies exclusively on some underlying symmetric primitive, can be securely composed with key exchange protocols provided that two main requirements hold: (1) No adversary can break the underlying primitive, even when the primitive uses keys obtained from executions of the key exchange protocol in the presence of the adversary (this is essentially the security requirement that we introduce and formalize in this paper), and (2) the security of the protocol can be reduced to that of the primitive, no matter how the keys for the primitive are distributed. Proving that the two conditions are satisfied, and then applying our generic theorem should be simpler than performing a monolithic analysis of the composed protocol. We exemplify our results in the case of a profile of the TLS protocol.

Keywords

Key agreement TLS 

Notes

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank the European Commission through the ICT Program under Contract ICT-2007-216676 ECRYPT II for partially funding the work in this paper. The first two authors were also supported by the German Academic Exchange Service DAAD, by CASED (www.cased.de), and the second author by the Emmy Noether Grant Fi 940/2-1 and the Heisenberg grant Fi 940/3-1 of the German Research Foundation DFG. The third author was supported by a Royal Society Wolfson Merit Award and by ERC Advanced Grant ERC-2010-AdG-267188-CRIPTO. The fifth author was supported by an EPSRC Doctoral Training Account award.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • C. Brzuska
    • 1
  • M. Fischlin
    • 1
  • N. P. Smart
    • 2
    Email author
  • B. Warinschi
    • 2
  • S. C. Williams
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceDarmstadt University of TechnologyDarmstadtGermany
  2. 2.Department Computer ScienceUniversity of BristolBristolUK

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