International Journal of Information Security

, Volume 11, Issue 2, pp 121–135 | Cite as

Formal analysis for robust anti-SPIT protection using model checking

  • Dimitris Gritzalis
  • Panagiotis Katsaros
  • Stylianos Basagiannis
  • Yannis Soupionis
Regular Contribution

Abstract

Anti-SPIT policies counter the SPam over Internet Telephony (SPIT) by distinguishing bots launching unsolicited bulks of VoIP calls from human beings. We propose an Anti-SPIT Policy Management mechanism (aSPM) that detects spam calls and prevents VoIP session establishment by the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). The SPIN model checker is used to formally model and analyze the robustness of the aSPM mechanism in execution scenarios with parallel SIP sessions. In case of a possible design flaw, the model checker provides a trace of the caught unexpected behavior (counterexample), that can be used for the revision of the mechanism’s design. Our SPIN model is parameterized, based on measurements from experiments with VoIP users. Non-determinism plays a key role in representing all possible anti-SPIT policy decisions, in terms of the SIP messages that may be exchanged. The model checking results provide evidence for the timeliness of the parallel SIP sessions, the absence of deadlocks or livelocks, and the fairness for the VoIP service users. These findings ensure robust anti-SPIT protection, meaning that the aSPM mechanism operates as expected, despite the occurrence of random SPIT calls and communication error messages. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first analysis for exhaustively searching security policy flaws, due to complex interactions between anti-SPIT measures and the SIP protocol services.

Keywords

Voice over IP (VoIP) Anti-SPIT security policies Robustness analysis Model checking 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dimitris Gritzalis
    • 1
  • Panagiotis Katsaros
    • 2
  • Stylianos Basagiannis
    • 2
  • Yannis Soupionis
    • 1
  1. 1.Information Security and Critical Infrastructure Protection Research Laboratory, Department of InformaticsAthens University of Economics and Business (AUEB)AthensGreece
  2. 2.Dependability and Security Group, Department of InformaticsAristotle University of Thessaloniki (AUTh)ThessalonikiGreece

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