Cognition, Technology & Work

, Volume 8, Issue 4, pp 227–236 | Cite as

The strengths and limitations of teams for detecting problems

Original Article
First Online:
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Abstract

Problem detection in operational settings requires expertise and vigilance. It is a difficult task for individuals. If a problem is not detected early enough, the opportunity to avoid or reduce its consequences may be lost. Teams have many strengths that individuals lack. The team can attend to a wider range of cues than any of the individuals can. They can offer a wider range of expertise, represent different perspectives, reorganize their efforts to adapt to situational demands, and work in parallel. These should improve problem detection. However, teams can also fall victim to a wide range of barriers that may reduce their alertness, mask early problem indicators, confound attempts to make sense of initial data, and restrict their range of actions. Therefore, teams may not necessarily be superior to individuals at problem detection. The capability of a team to detect problems may be a useful measure of the team’s maturity and competence.

Keywords

Problem detection Teams Team coordination Sensemaking Errors Decision making 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London Limited 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Klein Associates (A Division of Applied Research Associates)North FairbornUSA

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