Mathematical Programming

, Volume 110, Issue 3, pp 591–613 | Cite as

Equilibria for networks with malicious users

  • George Karakostas
  • Anastasios Viglas
Full Length Paper


We consider the problem of characterizing user equilibria and optimal solutions for selfish routing in a given network. We extend the known models by considering malicious behavior. While selfish users follow a strategy that minimizes their individual cost, a malicious user will use his flow through the network in an effort to cause the maximum possible damage to the overall cost. We define a generalized model, present characterizations of flows at equilibrium and prove bounds for the ratio of the social cost of a flow at equilibrium over the cost when centralized coordination among users is allowed.


Selfish routing Malicious user Equilibrium Saddle point 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computing and SoftwareMcMaster UniversityHamiltonCanada
  2. 2.School of Information TechnologiesUniversity of SydneySydneyAustralia

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