Economics of Governance

, Volume 19, Issue 1, pp 75–90 | Cite as

Weekend racer: cheating and self-governance in road racing

Original Paper


This paper studies how reputation enforces socially cooperative behavior in road racing in the New Orleans metro area. We find that reputation mechanisms have a much stronger effect for frequent road racers than for members of the New Orleans Track Club. We find that club membership cuts cheating in half while a runner who has finished at least one-third of the 2013 running season does not cheat. Thus, self-governance eliminates corruption when there is a reputational mechanism in place. Since data on informal running clubs are unavailable, our analysis underestimates the effect of club membership on socially cooperative behavior in road racing.


Self-governance Cheating Road race 

JEL Classification

J2 J16 J22 J71 L83 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Loyola University New OrleansNew OrleansUSA

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