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Profit allocation games in supply chains

  • Petr FialaEmail author
Original Paper

Abstract

The paper considers a supply chain where a number of agents are connected in some network relationship. Game theory is a very powerful framework for studying decision making problems, involving a group of agents in a supply chain. Allocation games examine the allocation of value among agents connected by a network. The ongoing actions in the supply chain are a mix of cooperative and non-cooperative behavior of the participants. The paper proposes a two-stage procedure for profit allocation based on combination of non-cooperative and cooperative game approaches. In the first stage, retailers meet customer price-dependent stochastic demand and seek to maximize total profit from the sale. Retailers are trying to align goals with producers on a contract basis and share the total profit with them. In the second stage, the cooperating producers allocate individual profits.

Keywords

Supply chain Game theory Allocation Cooperation Non-cooperation 

Notes

Acknowledgments

The research project was supported by the Grant No. 13-07350S of the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic and by Grant No. IGA F4/19/2013, Faculty of Informatics and Statistics, University of Economics, Prague.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of Informatics and StatisticsUniversity of EconomicsPragueCzech Republic

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