Central European Journal of Operations Research

, Volume 23, Issue 3, pp 547–562 | Cite as

Modelling practical placement of trainee teachers to schools

  • Katarína CechlárováEmail author
  • Tamás Fleiner
  • David F. Manlove
  • Iain McBride
  • Eva Potpinková
Original Paper


Several countries successfully use centralized matching schemes for assigning students to study places or fresh graduates to their first positions. In this paper we explore the computational aspects of a possible similar scheme for assigning trainee teachers to schools. Our model is motivated by the situation characteristic for Slovak and Czech education system where each pre-service teacher specializes in two subjects. We show that if the two subjects can be performed independently in two different schools, then a feasible assignment can be found efficiently by employing network flow techniques. By contrast, the requirement to perform both subjects at the same school leads to intractable problems even under several strict restrictions concerning the total number of subjects, partial capacities of schools and the number of acceptable schools each teacher is allowed to list. Finally, we report on an integer programming model for solving the ‘inseparable subjects’ case of the teachers assignment problem and the results of its application to real data.


Assignment Algorithm NP-completeness  Linear programming 



We would like to thank R. Orosová, N. Kocová, T. Bušová, R. Soták (UPJŠ Košice), I. Kohanová (Comenius University Bratislava) and N. Vondrová (Charles University Prague) for detailed explanations of practical aspects of student assignment and for providing us with the data.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Katarína Cechlárová
    • 1
    Email author
  • Tamás Fleiner
    • 2
    • 3
  • David F. Manlove
    • 4
  • Iain McBride
    • 4
  • Eva Potpinková
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute of Mathematics, Faculty of ScienceP.J. Šafárik UniversityKošiceSlovakia
  2. 2.Department of Computer Science and Information TheoryBudapest University of Technology and EconomicsBudapestHungary
  3. 3.MTA-ELTE Egerváry Research Group, Operations Research DepartmentEötvös UniversityBudapestHungary
  4. 4.School of Computing ScienceUniversity of GlasgowGlasgowUK

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