Clean Technologies and Environmental Policy

, Volume 15, Issue 1, pp 147–155 | Cite as

Issue linkage in clean technology cooperation: for better or worse?

Original Paper

Abstract

How should states negotiate and form international agreements to promote clean technology? This paper provides a game–theoretic analysis of the consequences of issue linkage between different technologies. The model suggests that issue linkage increases states’ incentives to participate in clean technology cooperation if their primary interest is in environmental protection and reduced consumer prices, as opposed to international competitiveness. However, issue linkage impedes clean technology cooperation if states mostly worry about international competitiveness. These findings can explain the decentralized nature of contemporary cooperation on clean technology and help devise strategies for inducing more countries to participate in clean technology cooperation.

Keyword

International cooperation Environmental policy Clean technology Issue linkage Game theory 

References

  1. Abbott KW, Snidal D (1998) Why states act through formal international organizations. J Confl Resolut 42(1):3–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Barrett S (2006) Climate treaties and ‘breakthrough’ technologies. Am Econ Rev 96(2):22–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Barrett S (2008) Climate treaties and the imperative of enforcement. Oxf Rev Econ Policy 24(2):239–258CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Barrett S, Toman M (2010) Contrasting future paths for an evolving global climate regime. Glob Policy 1(1):64–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Carraro C, Siniscalco D (1995) R&D cooperation and the stability of International Environmental Agreements. CEPR Discussion Paper 1154Google Scholar
  6. de Coninck H, Fischer C, Newell RG, Ueno T (2008) International technology-oriented agreements to address climate change. Energy Policy 36(1):335–356CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Haas EB (1980) Why collaborate? Issue-linkage and international regimes. World Politics 32(3):357–405CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Hart JA (1993) The use of R&D consortia as market barriers: case studies of consortia in the United States, Japan, and Western Europe. Int Exec 35(1):11–33CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Heymann M (1998) Signs of Hubris: the shaping of wind technology styles in Germany, Denmark, and the United States, 1940–1990. Technol Cult re 39(4):641–670Google Scholar
  10. Hoel M, de Zeeuw A (2010) Can a focus on breakthrough technologies improve the performance of International Environmental Agreements? Environ Resour Econ 47(3):395–406CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Kemfert C (2004) Climate coalitions and international trade: assessment of cooperation incentives by issue linkage. Energy Policy 32(4):455–465CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Keohane RO (1986) Reciprocity in international relations. Int Org 40(1):1–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Laird FN, Stefes C (2009) The diverging paths of German and United States policies for renewable energy: sources of difference. Energy Policy 37(7):2619–2629CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Levi MA, Economy EC, O'Neil SK, Segal A (2010) Energy innovation: driving technology competition and cooperation among the US, China, India, and Brazil. Council on Foreign Relations, November 2010Google Scholar
  15. Lewis JI (2007) Technology acquisition and innovation in the developing world: wind turbine development in China and India. Stud Comp Int Dev 42(3–4):208–232CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Lewis JI, Wiser RH (2007) Fostering a renewable energy technology industry: an international comparison of wind industry policy support mechanisms. Energy Policy 35(3):1844–1857CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Limão N (2005) Trade policy, cross-border externalities and lobbies: do linked agreements enforce more cooperative outcomes? J Int Econ 67(1):175–199CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Lipp J (2007) Lessons for effective renewable electricity policy from Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom. Energy Policy 35(11):5481–5495CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Lohmann S (1997) Linkage politics. J Confl Resolut 41(1):38–67CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Ostry S, Nelson RR (1995) Techno-nationalism and techno-globalism: conflict and cooperation. Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DCGoogle Scholar
  21. Oye KA (1992) Economic discrimination and political exchange: world political economy in the 1930s and 1980s. Princeton University Press, PrincetonGoogle Scholar
  22. PCT (2009) Who’s winning the clean energy race? Growth, competition and opportunity in the world’s largest economies. Pew Charitable Trusts, Washington, DCGoogle Scholar
  23. Rabe B (2004) Statehouse and greenhouse: the evolving politics of American climate change policy. Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DCGoogle Scholar
  24. Robbins N, Clover R, Singh C (2009) A climate for recovery: the colour of stimulus goes green. HSCB Global Research, LondonGoogle Scholar
  25. Sandholtz W (1992) High-tech Europe: the politics of international cooperation. University of California Press, BerkeleyGoogle Scholar
  26. Sebenius JK (1983) Negotiation arithmetic: adding and subtracting issues and parties. Int Org 37(2):281–316CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Sugiyama T, Sintom J (2005) Orchestra of treaties: a future climate regime scenario with multiple treaties among like-minded countries. Int Environ Agreem 5(1):65–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Tollison RD, Willett TD (1979) An economic theory of mutually advantageous issue linkages in international negotiations. Int Org 33(4):425–449CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. Tucker JB (1991) Partners and rivals: a model of international collaboration in advanced technology. Int Org 45(1):83–120CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Urpelainen J (2011) International technology cooperation: the problem of commercial rivalry. Rev Policy Res 28(5):423–450CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. Urpelainen J (2012) The strategic design of technology funds for climate cooperation: generating joint gains. Environ Sci Policy 15(1):92–105CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. Victor DG (2011) Global warming gridlock: creating more effective strategies for protecting the planet. Cambridge University Press, New YorkCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Watanabe C, Wakabayashi K, Miyazawa T (2000) Industrial dynamism and the creation of a ‘Virtuous Cycle’ between R&D, market growth and price reduction: the case of photovoltaic power generation (PV) development in Japan. Technovation 20(6):299–312CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceColumbia UniversityNew YorkUSA

Personalised recommendations