Review of Economic Design

, Volume 3, Issue 2, pp 137–147

Implementation of stable solutions in a restricted matching market

  • Antonio Romero-Medina

Abstract.

I analyze the admission mechanism used in Spanish universities. The system is open to strategic manipulation. This is because students are not allowed to express the whole list of available options. However, the mechanism implements the set of stable matchings in Nash equilibrium and the student's optimum in strong equilibrium. The mechanism also implements the students' optimum, in Nash equilibrium, under the class of “non-reverse” preferences. All these properties come from the fact that colleges do not have the opportunity to misrepresent their preferences.

JEL classification: C71, C78, D78, J24 Key words: Matching markets, implementation 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Antonio Romero-Medina
    • 1
  1. 1. Departament of Economics, University of California, Riverside, CA 92521, USA (e-mail: aromero@ucrac1.ucr.edu) US

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