Exchange-stability in roommate problems

  • Azar Abizada
Original Paper


We study one-sided matching problem, also known as roommate problem, where a group of people need to be paired in order to be assigned to certain rooms. We assume that number of rooms are limited and thus no one can be by himself. Each student has strict preferences over their roommates. Central notion in this problem is stability. We consider exchange-stability of Alcalde (Econ Des 1:275–287, 1995), which is immune to group of students exchanging their rooms/roommates with each other. He shows that exchange-stable matching may not always exist and considers specific domains of preferences to guarantee existence of such matching. We define more general domains of preferences on which exchange-stable matching is guaranteed to exist.


Roommate problem Exchange-stability Iteratively mutually best 

JEL Classification

C78 D71 



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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of BusinessADA UniversityBakuAzerbaijan

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