Review of Economic Design

, Volume 17, Issue 4, pp 323–333 | Cite as

Strategy-proofness on restricted separable domains

Original Paper
  • 117 Downloads

Abstract

We study a problem in which a group of voters must decide which candidates are elected from a set of alternatives. The voters’ preferences on the combinations of elected candidates are represented by linear orderings. We propose a family of restrictions of the domain of separable preferences. These subdomains are generated from a partition that identifies the friends, enemies and unbiased candidates for each voter. We characterize the family of social choice functions that satisfy strategy-proofness and tops-onlyness properties on each of the subdomains. We find that these domain restrictions are not accompanied by an increase in the family of social choice functions satisfying the two properties.

Keywords

Preference aggregation Strategy-proofness Tops-onlyness  Voting by committees 

JEL Classification

D63 D70 

References

  1. Barberà S, Sonnenschein H, Zhou L (1991) Voting by committees. Econometrica 59:595–609CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Barberà S, Maschler M, Shalev J (2001) Voting for voters: a model of electoral evolution. Games Econ Behav 37:40–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Barberà S (2011) Strategy-proof social choice. In: Arrow KJ, Sen AK, Suzumura K (eds) Handbook of social choice and welfare, vol 2. North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp 731–831Google Scholar
  4. Border K, Jordan JS (1983) Straightforward elections, unanimity and phantom voters. Rev Econ Stud 50:153–170CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Esteban J, Ray D (1994) On the measurement of polarization. Econometrica 62:819–851CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Gibbard A (1973) Manipulation of voting scheme: a general result. Econometrica 10:587–601CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Moulin H (1980) On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness. Publ Choice 35:437–455CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Penn E, Patty J, Gailmard S (2011) Manipulation and single-peakedness: a general result. Am J Polit Sci 55:436–449CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Sakai T (2012) Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem. Econ Theory 50:499–521CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Satterthwaite MA (1975) Strategy-proofness and arrow’s conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. J Econ Theory 10:187–217CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Departmento de EconomíaUniversidad Carlos III de MadridGetafe, MadridSpain
  2. 2.Departmento de Teoría EconómicaUniversidad de MálagaMalagaSpain

Personalised recommendations