Strategy-proofness on restricted separable domains
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We study a problem in which a group of voters must decide which candidates are elected from a set of alternatives. The voters’ preferences on the combinations of elected candidates are represented by linear orderings. We propose a family of restrictions of the domain of separable preferences. These subdomains are generated from a partition that identifies the friends, enemies and unbiased candidates for each voter. We characterize the family of social choice functions that satisfy strategy-proofness and tops-onlyness properties on each of the subdomains. We find that these domain restrictions are not accompanied by an increase in the family of social choice functions satisfying the two properties.
KeywordsPreference aggregation Strategy-proofness Tops-onlyness Voting by committees
JEL ClassificationD63 D70
- Barberà S (2011) Strategy-proof social choice. In: Arrow KJ, Sen AK, Suzumura K (eds) Handbook of social choice and welfare, vol 2. North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp 731–831Google Scholar