On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules
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Howard (J Econ Theory 56:142–159, 1992) argues that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash implementable, as it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. His arguments can be extended to other bargaining solutions as well. However, by defining a social choice correspondence that is based on the solution rather than on its realizations, one can overcome this shortcoming. We even show that such correspondences satisfy a stronger version of monotonicity that is even sufficient for Nash implementability.
KeywordsMaskin monotonicity Social choice rule Bargaining games Nash program Mechanism Implementation
JEL ClassificationC71 C78 D61
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