Review of Economic Design

, Volume 12, Issue 3, pp 209–227 | Cite as

On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers

Original Paper

Abstract

In this paper, we develop a model of law enforcement with the possibility of corruption between enforcers and potential offenders. We study how the violation rate changes with the level of the fine imposed on violations. We find, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, that the fine level that minimizes violations can be intermediate rather than large. We then study conditions under which different fine levels would be optimal.

Keywords

Corruption Law enforcement 

JEL Classification

K42 D73 D78 D82 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of British ColumbiaVancouverCanada
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsTOBB University of Economics and TechnologySogutozu, AnkaraTurkey
  3. 3.Department of Agricultural, Environmental, and Development EconomicsOhio State UniversityColumbusUSA

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