Review of Economic Design

, Volume 11, Issue 3, pp 217–224

On complexity of lobbying in multiple referenda

  • Robin Christian
  • Mike Fellows
  • Frances Rosamond
  • Arkadii Slinko
Original Paper

Abstract

In this paper we show that lobbying in conditions of “direct democracy” is virtually impossible, even in conditions of complete information about voters’ preferences, since it would require solving a very computationally hard problem. We use the apparatus of parametrized complexity for this purpose.

Keywords

Lobbying Referendum Parametrized complexity 

JEL Classification Numbers

D72 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robin Christian
    • 1
  • Mike Fellows
    • 2
  • Frances Rosamond
    • 2
  • Arkadii Slinko
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of Combinatorics and OptimizationUniversity of WaterlooWaterlooCanada
  2. 2.Parameterized Complexity Research UnitUniversity of NewcastleNewcastleAustralia
  3. 3.Department of MathematicsUniversity of AucklandAucklandNew Zealand

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