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Review of Economic Design

, Volume 11, Issue 3, pp 175–184 | Cite as

Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)

  • Bettina Klaus
  • Flip KlijnEmail author
  • Jordi Massó
Original Paper

Abstract

In this note we study the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) algorithm in the US market for physicians. We report on two problems that concern the presence of couples, a feature explicitly incorporated in the new NRMP algorithm (cf. Roth and Peranson in Am Econ Rev 89:748–780, 1999). First, we show that the new NRMP algorithm may not find an existing stable matching, even when couples’ preferences are ‘responsive’, i.e., when Gale and Shapley’s (Am Math Monthly 69:9–15, 1962) deferred acceptance algorithm (on which the old NRMP algorithm is based) is applicable. Second, we demonstrate that the new NRMP algorithm may also be anipulated by couples acting as singles.

Keywords

Matching Stability Couples 

JEL Classification

C78 D78 J41 

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsMaastricht UniversityMaastrichtThe Netherlands
  2. 2.CODE and Departament d’Economia i d’Història EconòmicaUniversitat Autònoma de BarcelonaBellaterra (Barcelona)Spain

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