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Environmental Economics and Policy Studies

, Volume 21, Issue 1, pp 25–36 | Cite as

Discriminatory tax and subsidy on environmental behaviors

  • Yoshinori WadaEmail author
Research Article
  • 50 Downloads

Abstract

This paper investigates the consumption tax and subsidy as an environmental policy instrument for environmentally aware consumers by applying the model of price discrimination. We discover that a higher rate of subsidy should be set for less eco-friendly consumers for the purpose of achieving socially optimal environmental qualities under positive externalities and this retrogressive subsidization differs from the current progressive subsidization in the Japanese automobile industry, and could alleviate crowding out effects on prosocial behavior. Moreover, it is revealed that the optimal policy instrument for eco-friendlier consumers shifts from a subsidy to a tax, as the level of negative externalities increases.

Keywords

Externalities Environmental awareness Incentives Price discrimination Pigouvian tax/subsidy 

JEL Classification

D03 D86 H23 L12 Q58 

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Copyright information

© Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies and Springer Japan KK, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of EconomicsDoshisha UniversityKyotoJapan

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