Environmental Economics and Policy Studies

, Volume 16, Issue 1, pp 89–110 | Cite as

Output-based allocation of emissions permits for mitigating the leakage and competitiveness issues for the Japanese economy

  • Shiro Takeda
  • Toshi H. Arimura
  • Hanae Tamechika
  • Carolyn Fischer
  • Alan K. Fox
Research Article

Abstract

The adoption of domestic emissions trading schemes (ETS) can impose a heavy burden on energy-intensive industries. Particularly, energy-intensive industries competing with foreign competitors could lose their international edge. Although the abatement of CO2 emissions in industrialized countries entails the reduction of their energy-intensive production, a corresponding increase in the production of energy-intensive goods in countries without CO2 regulations may lead to carbon “leakage.” This paper examines the effects of various allocation methods of emissions permits in the Japanese ETS on the economy and CO2 emissions using a multiregional and multisector computable general equilibrium model. Specifically, we apply the Fischer and Fox (Land Econ 83(4):575–599, 2007) model to the Japanese economy to address carbon leakage and competitiveness issues. We compare auction schemes, grandfathering schemes, and output-based allocation (OBA) schemes. We further extend the model by examining a combination of auctions and OBA. Though the auction scheme is found to be the best in terms of macroeconomic impacts, the leakage rate is high and the harm to energy-intensive sectors can be significant. OBA causes less leakage and damage to energy-intensive sectors, but the macroeconomic impact is undesirable. Considering all three effects—leakage, competitiveness, and macroeconomics—we find that combinations of auctions and OBA are desirable.

Keywords

Climate change Emissions trading Output-based allocation International competitiveness Carbon leakage 

JEL Classification

C68 D42 

Notes

Acknowledgments

We appreciate the financial support from the Center for Global Partnership, Japan Foundation, Mitsui & Co., Ltd. Environment Fund, the ENTWINED program of the Mistra Foundationm and JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 22330099. The content herein is the sole responsibility of the authors and does not represent an official position of their organizations.

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Copyright information

© Springer Japan 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Shiro Takeda
    • 1
  • Toshi H. Arimura
    • 2
  • Hanae Tamechika
    • 3
  • Carolyn Fischer
    • 4
  • Alan K. Fox
    • 5
  1. 1.Faculty of EconomicsKyoto Sangyo UniversityKyotoJapan
  2. 2.Faculty of Political Science and EconomicsWaseda UniversityTokyoJapan
  3. 3.Osaka UniversityOsakaJapan
  4. 4.Resources for the FutureWashington, DCUSA
  5. 5.US International Trade CommissionWashington, DCUSA

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