Advertisement

Tools for secure systems development with UML

  • Jan JürjensEmail author
  • Pasha Shabalin
Special section FASE'04/05

Abstract

For model-based development to be a success in practice, it needs to have a convincing added-value associated with its use. Our goal is to provide such added-value by developing tool-support for the analysis of UML models against difficult system requirements. Towards this goal, we describe a UML verification framework supporting the construction of automated requirements analysis tools for UML diagrams. The framework is connected to industrial CASE tools using XMI and allows convenient access to this data and to the human user. As a particular example, we present plugins for verifying models defined using the security extension UMLsec of UML. The verification framework allows advanced users of the UMLsec approach to themselves implement verification routines for the constraints of self-defined stereotypes. In particular, we focus on an analysis plug-in that utilizes the model-checker Spin to verify security properties of cryptography-based systems.

Keywords

Model-based development Tool-support UML Security Formal verification 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 1.
    Abadi, M.: Security protocols and their properties. In: Bauer, F.L., Steinbrüggen, R. (eds.) Foundations of Secure Computation, pp. 39–60. IOS Press, Amsterdam. 20th International Summer School, Marktoberdorf, Germany (2000)Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Abadi M. and Jürjens J. (2001). Formal eavesdropping and its computational interpretation. In: Kobayashi, N. and Pierce, B.C. (eds) Theoretical Aspects of Computer Software (4th International Symposium, TACS 2001), vol. 2215 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp 82–94. Springer, Heidelberg Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Best, B., Jürjens, J., Nuseibeh, B.: Model-based security engineering of distributed information systems using UMLsec. In: ICSE. ACM (2007)Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Breu, R., Popp, G., Alam, M.: Model based development of access policies. Int. J. Softw. Tools Technol. Transf (STTT). Contained in this issue (2006)Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Castor library. Available at http://castor.exolab.org (2003)Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Campbell L., Cheng B., McUmber W. and Stirewalt K. (2002). Automatically detecting and visualising errors in UML diagrams. Requir. Eng. 7(4): 264–287 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. 7.
    Crook, R., Ince, D.C., Lin, L., Nuseibeh, B.: Security requirements engineering: when anti-requirements hit the fan. In: RE, pp. 203–205. IEEE Computer Society (2002)Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Cohen E. (2003). First-order verification of cryptographic protocols. J. Comput. Secur. 11(2): 189–216 Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Devanbu, P., Stubblebine, S.: Software engineering for security: a roadmap. In: 22nd International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE 2000): Future of Software Engineering Track, pp. 227–239. ACM (2000)Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Dolev D. and Yao A. (1983). On the security of public key protocols. IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory IT-29(2): 198–208 CrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  11. 11.
    Engels, G., Küster, J., Heckel, R., Lohmann, M.: Model-based verification and validation of properties. Electr. Notes Theor. Comput. Sci. 82(7), (2003)Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Fernandez, E.B., Hawkins, J.C.: Determining role rights from use cases. In: Workshop on role-based access control, pp. 121–125. ACM (1997)Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Fernández-Medina, E., Martínez, A., Medina, C., Piattini, M.: UML for the design of secure databases: integrating security levels, user roles, and constraints in the database design process. In: Jürjens et al. [21], pp. 93–106Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Gentleware. http://www.gentleware.com (2003)Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Giorgini P., Massacci F. and Mylopoulos J. (2003). Requirement engineering meets security: a case study on modelling secure electronic transactions by VISA and Mastercard. In: Song, I.-Y., Liddle, S.W., Ling, T.W., and Scheuermann, P. (eds) 22nd International Conference on Conceptual Modeling (ER 2003), vol. 2813 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp 263–276. Springer, Heidelberg Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    Gurevich Y. (1995). Evolving algebras 1993: Lipari guide. In: Börger, E. (eds) Specification and Validation Methods, pp 9–36. Oxford University Press, Oxford Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    Houmb, S.H., den Braber, F., Lund, M.S., Stølen, K.: Towards a UML profile for model-based risk assessment. In: Jürjens et al. 21, pp. 79–92Google Scholar
  18. 18.
    Höhn, S., Jürjens, J.: Automated checking of SAP security permissions. In: 6th Working Conference on Integrity and Internal Control in Information Systems (IICIS). International Federation for Information Processing (IFIP). Kluwer, Academic Publishers (2003)Google Scholar
  19. 19.
    Huber, F., Molterer, S., Rausch, A., Schätz, B., Sihling, M., Slotosch, O.: Tool supported specification and simulation of distributed systems. In: International Symposium on Software Engineering for Parallel and Distributed Systems, pp. 155–164 (1998)Google Scholar
  20. 20.
    Holzmann G. (2003). The Spin Model Checker. Addison-Wesley, Reading Google Scholar
  21. 21.
    Jürjens, J., Cengarle, V., Fernandez, E.B., Rumpe, B., Sandner, R. (eds.) Critical Systems Development with UML (CSDUML 2002), TU München Technical Report TUM-I0208, 2002. UML 2002 satellite workshop proceedingsGoogle Scholar
  22. 22.
    Jürjens, J., Fox, J.: Tools for model-based security engineering. In: 28th International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE 2006). ACM (2006)Google Scholar
  23. 23.
    Jézéquel, J.-M., Hußmann, H., Cook, S. (eds.) In: 5th International Conference on the Unified Modeling Language (UML 2002), vol. 2460 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)Google Scholar
  24. 24.
    Jürjens J. and Shabalin P. (2004). Automated verification of UMLsec models for security requirements. In: Jézéquel, J.-M., Hußmann, H. and Cook, S. (eds) UML 2004—The Unified Modeling Language, vol. 2460 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp 412–425. Springer, Heidelberg Google Scholar
  25. 25.
    Jürjens, J., Shabalin, P.: Tools for secure systems development with UML In: FASE 2005, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Edinburgh, 2–10 April 2005. Springer, HeidelbergGoogle Scholar
  26. 26.
    Jürjens, J.: UMLsec webpage, 2002–06. Accessible at http://www.umlsec.orgGoogle Scholar
  27. 27.
    Jürjens, J.: UMLsec: Extending UML for secure systems development. In: Jézéquel et al. [23], pp. 412–425Google Scholar
  28. 28.
    Jürjens J. (2004). Secure Systems Development with UML. Springer, Heidelberg Google Scholar
  29. 29.
    Jürjens, J.: Sound methods and effective tools for model-based security engineering with UML. In: 27th International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE 2005). IEEE Computer Society (2005)Google Scholar
  30. 30.
    Kirby, J., Archer, M., Heitmeyer, C.: Applying formal methods to an information security device: An experience report. In: 4th IEEE International Symposium on High Assurance Systems Engineering (HASE 1999), pp. 81–88. IEEE Computer Society (1999)Google Scholar
  31. 31.
    Koch, M., Parisi-Presicce, F.: Access control policy specification in UML. In: Jürjens et al. [21], pp. 63–78Google Scholar
  32. 32.
    Kim D.-K., Ray I., France R.B. and Li N. (2004). Modeling role-based access control using parameterized UML models. In: Wermelinger, M. and Margaria, T. (eds) Fundamental Approaches to Software Engineering (FASE 2004), vol. 2984 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp 180–193. Springer, Heidelberg Google Scholar
  33. 33.
    Lodderstedt, T., Basin, D., Doser, J.: SecureUML: a UML-based modeling language for model-driven security. In: Jézéquel et al. [23], pp. 426–441Google Scholar
  34. 34.
    Lilius, J., Porres, I.: Formalising UML state machines for model checking. In: France, R.B., Rumpe, B. (eds.) The Unified Modeling Language (UML 1999), vol. 1723 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 430–445. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)Google Scholar
  35. 35.
    Meadows, C.: Open issues in formal methods for cryptographic protocol analysis. In: DARPA Information Survivability Conference and Exposition (DISCEX 2000), pp. 237–250. IEEE Computer Society (2000)Google Scholar
  36. 36.
    Mouratidis, H., Jürjens, J., Fox, J.: Towards a comprehensive framework for secure systems development. In: 18th International Conference on Advanced Information Systems Engineering (CAiSE 2006), Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)Google Scholar
  37. 37.
    Margaria T., Nagel R. and Steffen B. (2005). jETI: A tool for remote tool integration. In: Halbwachs, N. and Zuck, L.D. (eds) 11th International Conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems (TACAS 2005), vol. 3440 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp 557–562. Springer, Heidelberg Google Scholar
  38. 38.
    Object Management Group. MOF 1.4 Specification, April 2002. Available at http://www.omg.org/technology/documents/formal/mof.htmGoogle Scholar
  39. 39.
    Netbeans project. Open source. Available from http://mdr.netbeans.org (2003)Google Scholar
  40. 40.
    Novosoft NSUML project. Available from http://nsuml.sourceforge.net/ (2003)Google Scholar
  41. 41.
    Ober, Iu., Graf, S., Ober, Il.: Validation of UML models via a mapping to communicating extended timed automata. In: SPIN 2004, pp. 127–145 (2004)Google Scholar
  42. 42.
    Rivest R., Shamir A. and Adleman L. (1978). A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems. Commun. the ACM 21: 120–126 zbMATHCrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  43. 43.
    Schumann J. (1997). Automatic verification of cryptographic protocols with SETHEO. In: McCune, W. (eds) 14th International Conference on Automated Deduction (CADE-14), vol. 1249 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp 87–100. Springer, Heidelberg Google Scholar
  44. 44.
    Schäfer, T., Knapp, A., Merz, S.: Model checking UML state machines and collaborations. In: Stoller, S.D., Visser, W, (eds.) Workshop on Software Model Checking, vol. 55(3) of Electronical Notes in Theoretical Computer Science. Elsevier, 2001. Satellite event of the 13th International Conference on Computer-Aided Verification (CAV 2001)Google Scholar
  45. 45.
    The SMV system. Available from http://www-2.cs.cmu. edu/~modelcheck/smv.htmlGoogle Scholar
  46. 46.
    Sindre G. and Opdahl A.L. (2005). Eliciting security requirements with misuse cases. Requir. Eng. 10(1): 34–44 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  47. 47.
    Stoller S.D. (2002). A bound on attacks on authentication protocols. In: Baeza-Yates, R.A., Montanari, U. and Santoro, N. (eds) IFIP TCS, vol 223 of IFIP Conference Proceedings, pp 588–600. Kluwer, Dordrecht Google Scholar
  48. 48.
    Schmidt, ÁVarró, D.: CheckVML: a tool for model checking visual modeling languages. In: Stevens, P. (ed.) The Unified Modeling Language (UML 2003), vol. 2863 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 92–95. 6th International Conference. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)Google Scholar
  49. 49.
    Object Management Group: OMG Unified Modeling Language Specification v1.5. Version 1.5. OMG Document formal/03-03-01 (2003)Google Scholar
  50. 50.
    Object Management Group. OMG XML Metadata Interchange (XMI) Specification (2002)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Software and Systems EngineeringMunichGermany
  2. 2.Internet-based Information SystemsMunichGermany

Personalised recommendations