A verification approach to applied system security

Special section on formal methods for industrial critical systems

Abstract

We present a method for the security analysis of realistic models over off-the-shelf systems and their configuration by formal, machine-checked proofs. The presentation follows a large case study based on a formal security analysis of a CVS-Server architecture.

The analysis is based on an abstract architecture (enforcing a role-based access control), which is refined to an implementation architecture (based on the usual discretionary access control provided by the POSIX environment). Both architectures serve as a skeleton to formulate access control and confidentiality properties.

Both the abstract and the implementation architecture are specified in the language Z. Based on a logical embedding of Z into Isabelle/HOL, we provide formal, machine-checked proofs for consistency properties of the specification, for the correctness of the refinement, and for security properties.

Keywords

Verification Security Refinement  POSIX  

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Information SecurityETH ZürichZürichSwitzerland
  2. 2.Universität FreiburgFreiburgGermany

Personalised recommendations