A verification approach to applied system security

Special section on formal methods for industrial critical systems

Abstract

We present a method for the security analysis of realistic models over off-the-shelf systems and their configuration by formal, machine-checked proofs. The presentation follows a large case study based on a formal security analysis of a CVS-Server architecture.

The analysis is based on an abstract architecture (enforcing a role-based access control), which is refined to an implementation architecture (based on the usual discretionary access control provided by the POSIX environment). Both architectures serve as a skeleton to formulate access control and confidentiality properties.

Both the abstract and the implementation architecture are specified in the language Z. Based on a logical embedding of Z into Isabelle/HOL, we provide formal, machine-checked proofs for consistency properties of the specification, for the correctness of the refinement, and for security properties.

Keywords

Verification Security Refinement  POSIX  

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Information SecurityETH ZürichZürichSwitzerland
  2. 2.Universität FreiburgFreiburgGermany

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