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Requirements Engineering

, Volume 16, Issue 1, pp 55–73 | Cite as

A methodology for security assurance-driven system development

  • José Luis Vivas
  • Isaac Agudo
  • Javier López
Digital Privacy

Abstract

In this work, we introduce an assurance methodology that integrates assurance case creation with system development. It has been developed in order to provide trust and privacy assurance to the evolving European project PICOS (Privacy and Identity Management for Community Services), an international research project focused on mobile communities and community-supporting services, with special emphasis on aspects such as privacy, trust, and identity management. The leading force behind the approach is the ambition to develop a methodology for building and maintaining security cases throughout the system development life cycle in a typical system engineering effort, when much of the information relevant for assurance is produced and feedback can be provided to system developers. The first results of the application of the methodology to the development of the PICOS platform are presented.

Keywords

Security engineering Security assurance Assurance cases Built-in assurance 

Notes

Acknowledgments

The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2011) under grant agreement no. 215056.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London Limited 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Computer Science DepartmentUniversity of MalagaMálagaSpain

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