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Requirements Engineering

, Volume 15, Issue 1, pp 95–118 | Cite as

A UML-based static verification framework for security

  • Igor SiveroniEmail author
  • Andrea Zisman
  • George Spanoudakis
Special Issue-Security Requirements Engineering

Abstract

Secure software engineering is a new research area that has been proposed to address security issues during the development of software systems. This new area of research advocates that security characteristics should be considered from the early stages of the software development life cycle and should not be added as another layer in the system on an ad-hoc basis after the system is built. In this paper, we describe a UML-based Static Verification Framework (USVF) to support the design and verification of secure software systems in early stages of the software development life-cycle taking into consideration security and general requirements of the software system. USVF performs static verification on UML models consisting of UML class and state machine diagrams extended by an action language. We present an operational semantics of UML models, define a property specification language designed to reason about temporal and general properties of UML state machines using the semantic domains of the former, and implement the model checking process by translating models and properties into Promela, the input language of the SPIN model checker. We show that the methodology can be applied to the verification of security properties by representing the main aspects of security, namely availability, integrity and confidentiality, in the USVF property specification language.

Keywords

UML Security requirements Model checking SPIN 

Notes

Acknowledgments

This work was partially supported by the European Comission under the Information Society Technologies Programme as part of the project PEPERS (contract ISI-26901).

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London Limited 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Igor Siveroni
    • 1
    Email author
  • Andrea Zisman
    • 1
  • George Spanoudakis
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of ComputingCity University London Northampton SquareLondonUK

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