Bank competition, real investments, and welfare

  • Oz ShyEmail author
  • Rune Stenbacka


We construct an overlapping generations growth model, where young consumers choose how to allocate resources among real investment (deposits), acquisition of bank ownership, and young-age consumption. At old age, consumers sell bank ownership and collect their bank deposits to support consumption. The model shows that an increase in banks’ market power stimulates bank profit and bank value, thereby raising the resources required for young consumers to acquire bank ownership. This causes a crowding-out effect on real investment, the magnitude of which is amplified with higher endowment growth rate and real investment return. Finally, we conduct a welfare analysis of the investment crowding-out effect.


Investment crowding-out Size of the banking sector Deposit market competition Economic growth 

JEL Classification

G21 O41 



We are deeply indebted to two anonymous referees for their extensive guidance and proposed modifications that greatly improved this article. We also thank seminar participants at Tufts University and the Bank of Canada for valuable comments. Special thanks to Sofia Priazhkina and Maarten van Oordt for valuable suggestions. Rune Stenbacka acknowledges financial support from Suomen Arvopaperimarkkinoiden Edistamissaatio. The work on this project has started while Oz Shy was teaching at MIT Sloan School of Management.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Austria, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.NewtonUSA
  2. 2.Hanken School of EconomicsHelsinkiFinland

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