Price regulation, product location, and welfare
This paper investigates the imposition of a binding price ceiling and how it affects overall welfare and the location of a monopolist that is price-discriminating between two markets. The analysis shows that the imposition of a price-ceiling induces the monopolist to locate at the regulated market and that the imposition may actually reduce welfare. The setting is extended to a duopoly market. Two types of regulation are considered. The welfare implications of the regulations are discussed.
KeywordsPrice discrimination Price ceiling Multi-product firm
JEL ClassificationL51 L12 F23
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