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Journal of Economics

, Volume 89, Issue 2, pp 115–128 | Cite as

Government versus Opposition: Who Should be Who in the 16th German Bundestag?

  • Dinko Dimitrov
  • Claus-Jochen Haake
Article

Abstract

We model the process of coalition formation in the 16th German Bundestag as a hedonic coalition formation game. In order to induce players' preferences in the game we apply the Shapley value of the simple game describing all winning coalitions in the Bundestag. Using different stability notions for hedonic games we prove that the ``most'' stable government is formed by the Union Parties together with the Social Democratic Party.

Keywords

coalition formation Shapley value simple games winning coalitions 

JEL Classification

D72 C71 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Wien 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Mathematical EconomicsBielefeld UniversityBielefeldGermany

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