, Volume 100, Issue 2, pp 151–181 | Cite as

Trust strategy implementation in OppNets

  • Asma’a Ahmad
  • Robin Doss
  • Majeed Alajeely
  • Sarab F. Al Rubeaai


With the natural characteristics of Opportunistic networks (OppNets) where delivery is delayed with frequent disconnections between mobile nodes in dynamically changing routes to destinations, malicious nodes can perform selective packet dropping attacks easily without been identified easily. This is why securing the data flow without any loss becomes challenging in OppNets. In this paper, we present a solid trust based node and path detection technique against selective packet dropping attacks. Using the trust attribute with the Merkle hashing technique, a node’s identity can be validated, and malicious nodes can be detected. We integrate our proposed technique with Epidemic routing and use simulation to show how effective the technique works against selective packet dropping attacks. We use simulation to show how the node detection accuracy increases with time, as intermediate nodes have more time to establish trust with destination nodes. We also use simulation to show that delivery rates increase with increased storage, and show how our trust model improves and secures routing compared to non-trust models.


Opportunistic networks OppNets Trust Selective packet dropping attack Merkle tree Malicious node detection 

Mathematics Subject Classification



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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Austria 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Asma’a Ahmad
    • 1
  • Robin Doss
    • 1
  • Majeed Alajeely
    • 1
  • Sarab F. Al Rubeaai
    • 2
  1. 1.Center for Research and School of Information TechnologyDeakin UniversityGeelongAustralia
  2. 2.Department of Electrical and Computer EngineeringUniversity of WindsorWindsorCanada

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