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Neural Computing and Applications

, Volume 30, Issue 3, pp 865–870 | Cite as

A differential game related to terrorism: min-max zero-sum two persons differential game

  • Abd El-Monem A. Megahed
Original Article

Abstract

In this work, we are going to study a differential game related to terrorism: min-max two persons differential game, the question and discuss the qualitative of how best to prosecute the “war on terror” leads to strategic interaction in an inter-temporal setting. We consider a min-max differential game between a governments and a terrorist organization. To obtain the optimal strategy of this problem, we study the analytic form of min-max two persons differential game and a necessary conditions of this problem. Furthermore, we study a saddle point of a min-max differential game. Finally, we make a comparison between the game of the government and the terrorist organization. In the final, I hope from among this study introduce the optimal control and state trajectory to the governments to counter-terrorist.

Keywords

Game theory Terrorism Differential game Min-max game Saddle points 

Notes

Acknowledgements

My highly grateful and appreciation to the Basic Sciences Research Unit, Deanship of Scientific Research at Majmaah University for funding this study, Project No.23,1436 h-2015 ad.

Compliance with ethical standards

Conflicts of interest

The authors declare that they have no competing interest.

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Copyright information

© The Natural Computing Applications Forum 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Basic Science Department, Faculty of Computers and InformaticsSuez Canal UniversityIsmailiaEgypt
  2. 2.Mathematics Department, College of ScienceMajmaah UniversityZulfiSaudi Arabia

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