Soft Computing

, Volume 22, Issue 21, pp 7227–7241 | Cite as

Satisfied two-sided matching: a method considering elation and disappointment of agents

  • Zhi-Ping Fan
  • Ming-Yang LiEmail author
  • Xiao Zhang
Methodologies and Application


In practical two-sided matching problems, every agent usually cares about the matching result. If the result reaches or exceeds his/her expectation, he/she will experience elation; otherwise, he/she will experience disappointment. This is the psychological behavior of agents in two-sided matching, and the satisfaction degrees to the potential matching result of agents are closely related to the psychological behavior. However, the psychological behavior of agents is missing in the existing two-sided matching methods. The purpose of this paper is to develop a method for the two-sided matching problem considering psychological behavior of agents on both sides. First, the expected preference ordinals of each agent toward opposite agents are calculated based on the uncertain preference ordinals provided by agents. Then, the preference utility function is constructed, and the expected preference ordinals are transformed into preference utility values using the preference utility function. Next, based on the disappointment theory, the modified preference utility values are determined by calculating the disappointment values and elation values of each agent to the possible matching results. Furthermore, to maximize the sum of modified preference utility values of all agents on each side, a bi-objective optimization model is constructed, and the satisfied matching result can be obtained by solving the optimization model. Finally, a numerical example is used to illustrate the use of the proposed method.


Two-sided matching Uncertain preference ordinal Psychological behavior Disappointment Elation Optimization model 



This work was partly supported by the National Science Foundation of China (Project Nos. 71571039 and 71401131), Humanities and Social Science Foundation of Ministry of Education of China (Project No. 14YJC630063), Natural Science Basic Research Plan in Shaanxi Province of China (Program No. 2016JM7002) and the 111 Project (B16009).

Compliance with ethical standards

Conflict of interest

The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

Ethical standard

This article does not contain any studies with human participants or animals performed by any of the authors.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Information Management and Decision Sciences, School of Business AdministrationNortheastern UniversityShenyangChina
  2. 2.State Key Laboratory of Synthetical Automation for Process IndustriesNortheastern UniversityShenyangChina
  3. 3.Department of Management Science and Engineering, Business SchoolLiaoning UniversityShenyangChina
  4. 4.Department of Industrial Engineering, School of Economics and ManagementXi Dian UniversityXi’anChina

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