Stable set of uncertain coalitional game with application to electricity suppliers problem
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Coalitional game deals with the situation that involves cooperations among the players. When the payoffs are characterized by uncertain variables, classical coalitional game evolves to uncertain coalitional game. Some solutions of uncertain coalitional game have been proposed such as core and Shapley value. This paper goes further to present another concept of solution—stable set for uncertain coalitional game, and shows that the core is the subset of the stable set in an uncertain coalitional game. Finally, an electricity suppliers cooperation problem is analyzed by the stable set in uncertain coalitional game.
KeywordsUncertain variable Coalitional game Stable set Electricity suppliers problem
Funding was provided by National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 61374082 ).
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Conflict of interest
The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.
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