Soft Computing

, Volume 21, Issue 11, pp 3123–3134 | Cite as

Secure joint Bitcoin trading with partially blind fuzzy signatures

  • Qianhong Wu
  • Xiuwen Zhou
  • Bo Qin
  • Jiankun Hu
  • Jianwei Liu
  • Yong DingEmail author
Methodologies and Application


Bitcoin has recently received considerable attentions in both academia and industrial areas. It is an appealing anonymous electronic cash system-based peer-to-peer computer networks and does not rely on any centralized trusted authority. The Bitcoin is associated with a public/secret key pair where the security key is only known by its Bitcoin account owner. It is usually hosted on some platform and can only be spent after its owner and the platform sign on it. In this paper, we investigate how to jointly manage the Bitcoin trading when the Bitcoin account is possessed by multiple participants and how to simultaneously guarantee the anonymity of the multiple owners. We first consider the scenario where a single dealer possesses the Bitcoin account but authorizes multiple participants to jointly manage it. For instance, a company authorizes its several departments to manage its account. We next consider the scenario where the Bitcoin account is shared by some peers, e.g., joint investigators each of whom independent possesses a part of the account. The main challenge is that the signers are uncertain in different transactions. We propose partially blind threshold signatures with uncertain signers and their extensions to address this challenge. Analysis shows that our proposals are secure and efficient.


Bitcoin Threshold signature Secret sharing Soft computing Partially blind fuzzy signature 



This paper is partially supported by the National Key Basic Research Program (973 program) under project 2012CB315905, by the Natural Science Foundation of China under projects 61370190, 61272501, 61173154, 61402029 and 61003214, by the Beijing Natural Science Foundation through projects 4132056 and 4122041, by the Guangxi Natural Science Foundation through project 2013GXNSFBB053005 and the Guangxi Science Research & Technology Development Project 14124004-4-10, the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities, and the Research Funds (No. 14XNLF02) of Renmin University of China, the Open Research Fund of the State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Open Research Fund of Beijing Key Laboratory of Trusted Computing.

Compliance with ethical standards

Conflict of interest

The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Qianhong Wu
    • 1
  • Xiuwen Zhou
    • 1
  • Bo Qin
    • 2
  • Jiankun Hu
    • 3
  • Jianwei Liu
    • 1
  • Yong Ding
    • 4
    Email author
  1. 1.School of Electronics and Information EngineeringBeihang UniversityBeijingChina
  2. 2.The Key Laboratory of Data Engineering and Knowledge Engineering, Ministry of Education, School of InformationRenmin University of ChinaBeijingChina
  3. 3.School of Engineering and ITUniversity of New South WalesCanberraAustralia
  4. 4.School of Mathematics and Computing Science, Guangxi Key Laboratory of Cryptography and Information SecurityGuilin University of Electronic TechnologyGuangxiChina

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