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Distributed Computing

, Volume 29, Issue 1, pp 1–16 | Cite as

Fair and resilient Incentive Tree mechanisms

  • Yuezhou Lv
  • Thomas Moscibroda
Article

Abstract

We study Incentive Trees for motivating the participation of people in crowdsourcing or human tasking systems. In an Incentive Tree, each participant is rewarded for contributing to the system, as well as for soliciting new participants into the system, who then themselves contribute to it and/or themselves solicit new participants. An Incentive Tree mechanism is an algorithm that determines how much reward each individual participant receives based on all the participants’ contributions, as well as the structure of the solicitation tree. The sum of rewards paid by the mechanism to all participants is linear in the sum of their total contribution. In this paper, we investigate the possibilities and limitations of Incentive Trees via an axiomatic approach by defining a set of desirable properties that an Incentive Tree mechanism should satisfy. We give a mutual incompatibility result showing that there is no Incentive Tree mechanism that simultaneously achieves all the properties. We then present two novel families of Incentive Tree mechanisms. The first family of mechanisms achieves all desirable properties, except that it fails to protect against a certain strong form of multi-identity attack; the second set of mechanisms achieves all properties, including the strong multi-identity protection, but fails to give participants the opportunity to achieve unbounded reward. Given the above impossibility result, these two mechanisms are effectively the best we can hope for. Finally, our model and results generalize recent studies on multi-level marketing mechanisms.

Keywords

Multi-level marketing Crowdsourcing Incentive Trees Reward mechanisms 

Notes

Acknowledgments

This work was supported in part by the National Basic Research Program of China Grant 2011CBA00300, 2011CBA00302, the National Natural Science Foundation of China Grant 61033001, 61061130540, and the Hi-Tech research and Development Program of China Grant 2006AA10Z216.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute for Interdisciplinary Information Sciences (IIIS)Tsinghua UniversityBeijingChina
  2. 2.Tsinghua UniversityBeijingChina
  3. 3.Microsoft Research (MSR)BeijingChina
  4. 4.BeijingChina

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