Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 20, Issue 1, pp 137–154 | Cite as

Vote splitting, reelection and electoral control: Towards a unified model

  • Mauricio Soares Bugarin


This article presents a dynamic game theoretic model of voting in the presence of asymmetric information about a relevant parameter of the economy, the state of the world. Voters may use both vote splitting and reelection as mechanisms of electoral control. In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, voters will reelect an Executive incumbent if a minimum level of social outcome, n*, is attained. The main findings are that voters tend to be more demanding, requiring a higher value for n*, if they expect the true state of the world to be favorable, and less demanding if they believe the state of the world is unfavorable. Moreover, vote splitting will be chosen if a favorable state is expected, whereas if an unfavorable state is more likely, voters reduce pressure over the incumbent by choosing a unified government.


Theoretic Model Favorable State True State Minimum Level Relevant Parameter 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mauricio Soares Bugarin
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Economics, University of Brasilia, Asa Norte, 70910-900, Brasilia, DF, Brazil (e-mail:

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