Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 19, Issue 3, pp 659–664

Toward general impossibility theorems in pure exchange economies

  • Miki Kato
  • Shinji Ohseto

DOI: 10.1007/s003550100143

Cite this article as:
Kato, M. & Ohseto, S. Soc Choice Welfare (2002) 19: 659. doi:10.1007/s003550100143

Abstract.

We study the possibility of strategy-proof and efficient mechanisms in pure exchange economies. In his remarkable paper, Zhou (1991) establishes an elegant impossibility result: there is no strategy-proof, efficient, and non-dictatorial mechanism in the two-agent case. He conjectures that there is no strategy-proof, efficient, and “non-inversely-dictatorial” mechanism in the case of three or more agents. However, we discover some counterexamples to his conjecture in the case of four or more agents. We present a new interesting open question: Is there any strategy-proof, efficient, and “non-alternately-dictatorial” mechanism?

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Miki Kato
    • 1
  • Shinji Ohseto
    • 2
  1. 1. Department of Social Welfare, Tokyo Metropolitan University, Hachioji, Tokyo 192-0397, JapanJP
  2. 2. Faculty of Economics, Tokyo Metropolitan University, Hachioji, Tokyo 192-0397, Japan (e-mail: ohseto@bcomp.metro-u.ac.jp)JP

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